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Articles
James McL. Hendry* Some Observations on
the Canadian Regulatory
Agency
1. The Fourth Branch of Government
Government is growing at a rapid rate and its growth will continue
in the foreseeable future. The quest for more and more social
security, the growing awareness of the necessity for central
regulation, particularly of our environment and natural resources,
the inevitable decelerating of a economic activity, all call for
increased governmental enterprise. This increase in governmental
functions means a consequent curtailment of individual liberty and
this curtailment must be carefully weighed in the light of the
common good. In this uncertain day and age of rapid change, it is
most imperative that our politico-legal processes be kept under
constant review.
Boards, commissions and other administrative agencies' called
by various names now regulate nearly every phase of the
individual's social and economic conduct. Federally, administrative
agencies have considerable powers of control over such wide-
ranging enterprises as broadcasting, telecommunications, tariffs,
transportation and energy. Provincially, a host of conciliators,
assessors, examiners, referees and trustees operate under provincial
statutory authority to regulate such areas as labour relations,
education and the use of property. Municipally, an assortment of
fire marshalls, engineers, inspectors and registrars, to name a few,
operate under municipal ordinances to require individuals to
maintain their property in a certain way, to regulate how, when and
where they build and, in many circumstances, how, when and
where they carry on their businesses.
The validity of the controls over the conduct of the individual's
activities, depends on the powers bestowed on the functions utilized
by the administrative agency. These powers and functions vary
*James McL. Hendry, B.A., 1939, LL.B., 1947, Dalhousie University; LL.M,
1948, Harvard University; LL.M., 1949, S.J.D., 1955, University of Michigan.
1. I use the term "administrative agency" in its widest sense. It includes all
individuals and groups of individuals operating under statutory authority.
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from agency to agency. Agencies generally act by applying the facts
to prescribed standards set forth in the enabling legislation, although
some may be given considerable discretion. Some may perform
advisory roles, such as coroner's juries, conciliators and boards of
inquiry. After inquiry into the relevant circumstances, their job is to
ascertain the facts and to recommend a course or courses of action,
but they have no power to enforce their recommendations. Some
agencies may adjudicate upon claims, such as workmen's
compensation boards and unemployment insurance boards. They
perform a judicial function analogous to the regular courts. Still
others may operate primarily in the field of legislation by
recommending policy and standards to be followed. 
2
The greatest array of powers and functions are found in those
administrative agencies that regulate vast economic undertakings,
such as broadcasting, transportation and oil and gas. They embrace
in one body all the usual functions of government. It is trite to say
that in the complex economy of today it is not possible for the
regular legislature, the regular executive and the regular judiciary to
legislate, execute (administer) or interpret all the law of a modem
community. Some delegation is necessary. The characteristic of the
regulatory agency, as I will call this type of administrative agency,
is that the regular governing body has granted considerable powers
of government, that is, powers of legislating, executing (administer-
ing) and adjudicating to these bodies. They may be likened to little
governmentd complete in themselves inasmuch as they are compact
legislating, executing (administering) and adjudicating units. It is
noteworthy that the regulatory agency and its resultant action more
directly concern individuals than the regular government as
licences, certificates, orders and other expressions of the will of
these powerful bodies are often more crucial to individuals than the
enactment of the general authority under which they are made.
The reasons for the growth of this method of governing - this
so-called fourth branch of government - are many. In addition to
the obvious and foremost reason - that is, the inability of the three
branches of the regular government to cope with quantity - highly
specialized experts are required to adequately deal with intricacies
of such magnitude and depth as evince themselves in broadcasting,
transportation and oil and gas operations. The regulatory agencies in
these fields require trained and skilful personnel who, in general,
2. Such as the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (see R.S.C. 1970, c. F-24) and
the Science Council of Canada (see R.S.C. 1970, c. S-5).
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are better qualified than the people's representatives in Parliament,
ministers of the Crown and members of the judiciary to make,
execute (administer) and interpret the peculiar laws required for the
regulation of these segments of the economy.
In addition, the duties of representatives, ministers and members
do not permit the great amount of time needed with the problems
that will arise. In a few words, they do not have the necessary
man-power or organization. Further, in many cases, they do not
have the flexibility that is so necessary for satisfactory solutions in
the fields in which the regulatory agencies operate. For example,
conventions of the legislatures, effectiveness of executive action
and the system of precedent in the courts may often hinder practical
solutions and make difficult, if not impossible evolution of
workable concepts. The ways of the regulatory agency are, for the
most part, empirical and many, if not most, of the ways have not
been trodden before.
Another reason for the growth of the administrative agency and,
in particular, the regulatory agency is the need for intensive,
independent investigation before action is taken. Should a
broadcasting medium be established in a certain area? Is it in the
public interest? Should or should not an established railway line be
abandoned? What are the criteria to be applied in determining this
question? Should the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline be built? Is this in
the public interest? Before persuasive answers can be given to these
and similar questions, much investigation, patient exploration of
facts and assimilation of many opinions are required. Thus the
regulatory agency not only provides celerity, expertise and
flexibility but also represents the principle that it is good
government to correct evil before it arises rather than to legislate or
adjudicate with respect to the evil after it arises.
Furthermore, the regulatory agency provides an effective political
arm for ascertaining the effectuating policy in particular areas where
government, for some reason, does not act. With respect to this
reason, Professor John Willis has said:
(They) at first sight look like courts in that they hold hearings and
apply statutory standards - such as "fit and proper person",
"public convenience and necessity", "just and reasonable
rates", "in the public interest" and so on - to the facts of
individual cases coming before them but are in reality minor
"legislative" bodies pricking out a policy. 3
3. Administrative Law in Canada (1961), 39 Can. B. Rev. 251 at 260.
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The regulatory agency does not primarily decide rights between
individuals and other legal entities in the sense of adjudicating
competing claims to rights recognized by statute or by common law.
Nor are the regulatory agencies mainly concerned with the
determinations under the usual rubrics of tort, contract, property or
criminal law. They are for the most part concerned with policy
matters such as the proper content of programs of television and
radio, the operation of airlines in particular areas and the
construction of gas and oil pipelines in Canada. In general, they
deal with granting or withholding privileges of operating in
particular fields of enterprise. The determination of these questions
and the consequent granting or refusing of permits (called by
various names) involve the consideration of far-ranging policy
questions of social, economic and political import in Canada. When
the agency grants the permit, it grants a privilege after these policy
considerations have been taken into account. In result, the privilege
is granted if the regulatory agency deems it a matter of public policy
to grant it.
4
The powers and functions of three major regulatory agencies in
Canada - the Canadian-Radio Television Commission, the
Canadian Transport Commission and the National Energy Board -
will be briefly outlined and referred to from time to time for
illustrating points under discussion.
The Broadcasting Act5  establishes the Canadian Radio-
Television Commission. As expressed in section 15 of the Act, the
Commission shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian
broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting
policy enunciated in section 3 of this Act. Section 3 sets forth a
broadcasting policy for Canada which includes among its principles
4. In determining the validity of certain increases in tariffs of fees to be paid for
licences for private commercial radio broadcasting stations Procureur Giniral du
Canada v. Compagnie de Publication La Presse, [1967] S.C.R. 60; 63 D.L.R.
(2d) 396, Abbott, J. said, at 76 (63 D.L.R. (2d) at 408):- ". . . such a licence
merely involves a permission to trade, subject to compliance with certain
conditions. In the present case, there is no contractual relationship between the
Crown and the respondent, and the latter had no vested or property right in the
licence which it held. What it did have was a privilege granted by the state,
conferring authority to do something which without such permission would be
illegal." He continues (at 77(408))' "In view of the nature of the right held by a
person licensed to operate a private commercial broadcasting station, I am of
opinion that the Governor in Council can validly increase or decrease the fees
payable by such a licensee at any time during the currency of the licence."
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11.
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a single broadcasting system owned and controlled by Canadians,
varied programming in English and in French and the establishment
of a corporation (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) to
provide a national broadcasting service that will be predominantly
Canadian in content.
An Act, called the National Transportation Act, 6 to define and
implement a national transportation policy for Canada, received
vice-regal assent on the 9th day of February, 1969. It declared in
Section 3 that an economic, efficient and adequate transportation
system making the best use of all available modes of transportation
at the lowest total cost is essential to protect the interests of the users
of transportation and to maintain the economic well-being and
growth of Canada. 7 The Canadian Transport Commission carries
out this policy for the most part through eight committees each
operating within a defined jurisdiction set out in the General Rules
of the Canadian Transport Commission.
8
The National Energy Board was established in June, 1959, by the
National Energy Board Act, 9 to regulate the construction of oil and
gas pipelines and international power lines and to control the
exportation and importation of oil and gas and the exportation of
power.
It is submitted that the regulatory agency accomplishes three
general types of acts, - the administrative act, the advisory act and
the regulatory act. Administrative acts are analogous to those
performed by the higher echelons of the executive branch of
government. These acts are a consequence of the execution of
parliamentary policy. 10 They are decisions made in accordance with
a statutory mandate or prerogative power.1 Advisory acts include
6. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
7. The Prime Minister said prior to the election of 8th July, 1974, that the
government would be abandoning the structure which was based on the belief that
competition would result in lower rates for the consumer of railway services.
Apparently Canadians may now expect a system where freight rates will be based
on costs rather than on competition.
8. General Order, 1967-1, dated 20 September 1967, as amended.
9. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-6 as amended by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.) c. 10, c.27 and c.
44 and R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.) c. 10.
10. The courts have recognized for some time the right of administrative agencies
to make administrative (policy) decisions. For example, in Re Electric Power Act;
Re West Canadian Hydro Electric Corp., [1950] 3 D.L.R. 321 (B.C.S.C.) at 411,
it was stated: "The cases reveal an increasing tendency on the part of the Courts to
concede to bureaux such as the Public Utilities Commission, the right to arrive at
conclusions on the basis of policy and expediency rather than at law."
11. I will not adhere to the distinction between an administrative act and a judicial
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the important function of advising the Crown on all matters of state.
There is no apparent reason why this role is reserved to Ministers of
the Crown. 12 Indeed, as already noted,1 3 it may be considered as
another reason for the regulatory agency. For example, the
Canadian Radio-Television Commission may, after hearing, issue,
amend or renew any broadcasting licence. But the wide powers of
the Governor-in-Council to issue directions to the Commission and
to refer back to the Commission decisions for rehearing 4 places the
Commission theoretically in an advisory role.
The regulatory acts are those acts concerned with the actual
administration of the enabling legislation and the policy decisions
made thereunder. Thus the Canadian Transport Commission
(through its Railway Committee) regulates the construction,
maintenance and operation of railways, including matters of
engineering, locations of lines, crossings, operating rules, investig-
ations of accidents, accomodation for traffic and facilities for
service, freight and passenger tariffs and rates and railway
accounting. The wide administrative powers exercised by the
Commission (through its Air Transport Committee) are well
illustrated in the regulations that the Commission may make.' 5
They may, to mention a few, prescribe the forms of accounts and
records to be kept by air carriers. They may require air carriers to
file with the Commission returns with respect to their assets,
liabilities, capitalization, revenues, expenditures, equipment, traffic
and employees. They may provide for uniform bills of lading and
other documentation, govern minimum insurance requirements and
disallow, suspend, substitute and prescribe tariffs and tolls to be
act insofar as the principles of natural justice or fair dealing have been judicially
held not to apply to administrative acts but only to acts which are characterized as
judicial. The distinction is not accurate as applied to the regulatory agency. As will
be shown some administrative acts are subject to the quasi-judicial function. See
also theFederal CourtAct, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1, s. 28; infra, note 54.
12. "This function is one peculiarly reserved to Ministers of the Crown. It covers a
great variety of matters which the legislature and constitutional usage have left
within the discretion of the Crown. At the core of constitutional monarchy is the
principle that the Crown must accept the advice of Ministers who have the
confidence of the legislature. What the advice shall be is a matter solely for the
Crown's advisers, provided they can maintain that confidence". B.L. Strayer,
Injuctions Against Crown Officers (1964), 42 Can. B.Rev. I at 29.
13. 1 am referring particularly to the expertise of the regulatory agency.
14. Broadcasting Act, s. 27.
15. Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, s. 14. Other regulations may be made
by the Minister and by the Governor in Council but they are almost invariably made
on the recommendation of the Commission.
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charged by licensed air carriers. Statutory provisions may confer
judicial duties on the agency, such as the power to award
compensation in certain defined instances. 1
6
Administrative, advisory and regulatory acts may be performed
by legislative, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
other words, the agencies' acts may be the result of the use of either
one or more of these functions. As Sir W. Ivor Jennings so clearly
points out, these functions differ only in degree. 17 Thus regulations
and rules made under the enabling legislation may differ from
orders made under administrative powers only in scope of operation
and effect. One is of general application and the other applies to one
entity only. Similarly decisions made after a judicial inquiry only
bind the parties concerned but their practical effect may be much
more far-reaching. However, the major consequences of the method
employed in accomplishing the act are to be found in the legal
incidents attached to each method or function.
Little elaboration is needed on the legislative function. Within the
confines of the enabling statutes, the agencies issue their own rules
of practice and procedure and various regulations in respect to
carrying out the purposes of the statute. Somewhat analogously to
this delegated legislation, they issue written decisions, policy
statements and other types of general directions that serve as guides
for the conduct of their jurisdictional entities. However, their
discretion to perform the acts required by their statutory mandate
must not be unduly curtailed by such decisions, statements or
directions. 18
The employment of the administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial
function as the method of arriving at the resultant act is dependent
on the nature of the decision to be rendered by the agency in light of
all circumstances. This is a matter of interpretation and
classification. 19. Like any decision-making body, the regulatory
agency must first ascertain the facts and then render its decision
16. See e.g. National Energy BoardAct, s. 72.
17. The Law and the Constitution (5th ed. London: University of London Press,
1959), particularly Chapter I and Appendix I.
18. Infra.
19. That the determination depends on the characterization of functions of the
administrative agency and the broad nature of the inquiry is illustrated in the
following judicial expressions:
"The true test therefore is to see what the function of the tribunal is. Is it to
ascertain legal rights and liabilities or to create them? Is it to apply the law or
policy as expediency? Is it to be guided by law or is it a law unto itself?" (Re
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after applying prescribed rules or standards or, if no rules or
standards exist, in accordance with the dictates of its own
discretion. Thus our regular courts generally find rules or standards
that they will apply to individual cases that come before them in
previously decided cases. Sometimes they may be guided by the
provisions of a statute. However, at times they may have neither of
these sources to turn to and "[iun such cases the judges have usually
created their new rules in harmony with what they have believed to
be "the contemporary common sense and needs of the nation.' '20 If
the standards or rules are prescribed, obviously less discretion is
utilized in proportion to their detail. If the statute prescribes that
certain financial, economic and market conditions must exist before
a certificate is issued, there is some curtailment of discretion. If the
statute further decrees that only those companies which have been
incorporated before a certain date shall be issued a certificate, the
discretion is further curtailed. Agencies that apply such general
standards as "public convenience and necessity", "just and
reasonable rates" obviously exercise a greater discretion than an
agency that determines whether a workman is entitled to a money
payment if he fulfills certain conditions. Herein, it is said,21 lies the
distinction between the administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial
function. A purely administrative function involves no exercise of
discretion. It is the automatic application of definite standards to
undisputed facts. Many of the regulatory acts fall into this category
as when a safety inspector makes routine checks of a pipeline or a
railway. The fact-finding process also is generally classified as an
exercise of the administrative function as illustrated by reports of
Brown and Brock and Rentals Administrator, [1945] O.R. 554 (C.A.) at 564
(per Roach, J.A.); [1945] 3 D.L.R. 324 at 333).
"In each case the Court must examine the duty imposed on the tribunal and in
doing so no great assistance is derived from decisions that fall on one side of the
line of the other unless these cases state principles." (R. v. Board of Broadcast
Governors, Ex parte Swift Current Telecasting Co., [1962] O.R. 190 at 200 (per
McRuer, C.J.H.C.); (1961) 1 D.L.R. (2d) 385 at 395, rev'd [1962] O.R. 657;
33 D.L.R. (2d) 449).
"In determing whether or not a body or an individual is exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial duties, it is necessary to examine the defined scope of its
functions and then to determine whether or not there is imposed a duty to act
judicially." (Calgary Power Ltd. v. Copithorne, [1959] S.C.R. 24 at 30 (per
Martland, J.); 16 D.L.R. (2d) 241 at 247.
20. Horace E. Read, The Judicial Powers in Common Law Canada (1959), 37
Can. B. Rev. 265 at 285.
21. See, for examples, notes 25,26, infra.
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examiners and other officials to ascertain facts and report thereon. 22
But it is difficult to envisage the exercise of a purely administrative
function. There will invariably be some element of discretion in the
official who applies the standard or makes a report. Although
somewhat analogous to the exercise of the quasi-judicial function,
such acts are better categorized as resulting from the administrative
function as they do not involve matters of policy and are more in the
nature of recommendations. However, it is evident that the line is
indistinct.
The judicial function is generally confined to questions which
affect the established rights of the parties as found in statute or in the
common law. Standards for guidance can usually be found but the
discretion involved in the exercise of the judicial function is often
considerable. This raises highly jurisprudential questions of how far
the judiciary makes the law which are beyond the scope of this
paper.
What then is the quasi-judicial function? The term is obsure in
precise definition and, it is submitted, no better explanation can be
found than in the "Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers",
presented by the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament by Command
of His Majesty, April, 1932. The Lord Chancellor said:
23
The word 'quasi' when prefixed to a legal term generally means
that the thing which is described by the word has some of the
legal attributes denoted and connoted by the legal term, but that it
has not all of them. For instance, if a transaction is described as a
quasi-contract it means that the transaction has some of the
attributes of a judicial decision, but not all. In order, therefore, to
define the term quasi-judicial decision', as it is used in our terms
of reference, we must discover which of the attributes of a true
judicial decision are included and which are excluded.
A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between
two or more parties, and then involves four requisites: (1) the
presentation (not necessarily orally of their case by the parties to
the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact,
the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by
the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of
argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the
dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of
legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes
of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an
22. Infra.
23. Generally referred to as the Donoughmore Committee Report. Cmd. 4060
(1932) at 73-4.
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application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including
where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law.
A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute
between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does
not necessarily involve (3), and never involves (4) The place of
(4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of
which is determined by the Minister's free choice.
For example, suppose a statute empowers a Minister to take
action if certain facts are proved, and in that event gives him an
absolute discretion whether or not he will take action. In such a
case he must consider the representations of the parties and
ascertain the facts - to that extent the decision contains a judicial
element. But, the facts once ascertained, his decision does not
depend on any legal or statutory direction for ex hypothesi he is
left free within his statutory powers to take such administrative
action as he may think fit: that is to say, the matter is not finally
disposed of by the process of (4). Whereas it is of the essence of a
judicial decision that the matter is finally disposed of by that
process and nothing remains to be done except the execution of
the judgement a step which the law of the land compels
automatically, in the case of the quasi-judicial decision the
finality of (4) is absent; another and a different kind of step has
been taken; the Minister - who for this purpose personifies the
whole administrative Department of State - has to make up his
mind whether he will or will not take administrative action if so
what action. His ultimate decision is 'quasi-judicial', and not
judicial, because it is governed, not by a statutory direction to
him to apply the law of the land to the facts and act accordingly,
but by a statutory permission to use his discretion after he has
ascertained the facts and to be guided by considerations of public
policy. This option would not be open to him if he were
exercising a purely judicial function.
It is obvious that if all four of the above-named requisites to a
decision are present, if, for instance, a Minister, having
ascertained the facts, is obliged by the statute to decide solely in
accordance with the law, the decision is judicial. The fact that it
is not reached by a court so-called, but by a Minister acting under
statutory powers and under specialized procedure, will not make
the decision any the less judicial.
This excellent explanation of the quasi-judicial function illus-
trates that though similar it is not the judicial function; that only
some of the attributes of a judicial inquiry are present and that the
"decision does not rest on any legal or statutory direction".
Although described as a quasi-judicial decision, its main difference
is the method by which the decision is reached. It is an
administrative act reached by "quasi-judicial" means.
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The explanation was stated in England over forty years ago and
the principles are still very much alive today. Although statutory
standards may be found in a general way guiding the regulatory
agencies, they are indefinite and do not circumscribe to any great
degree their mandate to make "policy" decisions. Thus the
National Energy Board Act prescribes certain indefinite standards
for the issue of certificates "if the Board is satisfied that the line is
and will be required by the present and future public convenience
and necessity", after taking "into account all such matters as to it
appear to be relevant". 24 The statute then lists certain matters, such
as supply, markets, financibility, economic feasibility to determine
the viability of the enterprise to which the Board may have regard in
reaching its decision. Here, it is true, some standards are prescribed
but there is little doubt that the decision is arrived at by
quasi-judicial means.2 5 The discretion is considerable, if not
complete; it is a decision characterized as policy or administrative; it
is a decision based on expendiency rather than formalized
standards. 26
Further insight into the character of the administrative act of the
regulatory agency and the attributes and consequences of the
quasi-judicial function may be found in an Ontario case decided in
the Court of Appeal. In Re Cloverdale Shopping Centre Ltd. and
Township of Etobicoke2 7 the respondent sought an amendment to an
24. S. 44. See also note 88, infra.
25. See Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, (Hon. J. C. McRuer,
Commissioner) Report No. I Vol. 1, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 29:
The terminology in this branch of the law of Ontario is further complicated by a
subdivision of administrative powers. In legal parlance it is said in some cases
administrative powers must be exercised by "acting judicially". That is, the
decision, although administrative because it is arrived at on grounds of policy,
is to be made after compliance with certain minimum standards of fair
procedure, somewhat resembling judicial procedure. For example, the tribunal
exercising the power may be required to hold a hearing not unlike a trial before
it reaches its decision. In these cases, the administrative power is termed
"quasi-judicial".
26. But it is recognized that this is a sandy foundation for the distinction between
"judicial" and "quasi-judicial" functions. See, for example, Griffith and Street,
The Principles of Administrative Law (5th ed. London:Pitman, 1973) where, at
149, it is stated: "this word "policy" must be looked at circumspectly: it has an
emotive force which conjures up a vision of some matter which should be settled at
Cabinet Level .... Properly understood. policy should be limited to the ultimate
value judgments. There is a graduated scale of decisions at one end of which the
ethical judgment is all important, and at the other end of which is a factual
proposition, and all issues between are a blending of the two."
27. [1966] 2 O.R. 439; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 206 (Ont. C.A.).
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official plan to permit commercial development of certain property.
The Planning Board approved the amendment in principle and town
council adopted the report and then enacted a by-law amending the
official plan and the appropriate zoning by-laws. The zoning
by-laws came before the Ontario Municipal Board and the by-law
amending the official plan was submitted to the Minister as required
by sections 12 and 14 of the Planning Act.2 8 He referred it to the
Municipal Board pursuant to section 34 (1).29 The Ontario
Municipal Board held extensive hearings and, in essence, approved
the amendments. The decision was attacked on the ground, inter
alia, "that the Board misunderstood its function and in its decision
does violence to the "standards or principles" governing official
plans and amendments thereto as allegedly expressed in the Act and
as allegedly governing its decision". 30 In other words, it is claimed
that the Board was governed by other than usual judicial
considerations in reaching its conclusion.
The question posed to the Court was whether the "functions of
the Municipal board in determining the question of an amendment
to the official plan proposed by council are precisely those of the
Minister when the matter has been referred to the Board by the
Minister under s. 34... ".31
The Court held that "[i]n all such cases [amending the official
plan and zoning by-laws] broad questions of policy come into play.
The function of the Board as well as the function of the Minister is
administrative in character. The decision to be made transcends the
interests of the immediate parties. In my view, a consideration of
provisions of the Planning Act taken as a whole makes this
abundantly clear".32
The Court fortified its conclusion by referring to,3 3 first, Union
Gas Co of Canada v. Sydenham Gas and Petroleum Co. 34 in which
28. R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, as am. by S.O. 1961-62, c. 104 (Now R.S.O. 1970, c.
349).
29. Section 34(1) (now section 15 (i)) then read: "When under this Act the
approval or consent of the Minister is applied for, the Minister may, and upon
application therefore shall, refer the matter to the Municipal Board in which case
the approval or consent, as the case may be, of the Municipal Board has the same
force and effect as if it were the approval or consent of the Minister".
30. [1966]2 O.R. at 444; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at211.
31. Id. at 448; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at 215.
32. Id. at 449; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at 216.
33. Id. at 450; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at 217.
34. [1957] S.C.R. 185; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 65; 75 C.R.T.C. 1. See also Memorial
Garden Association (Canada) Ltd. v. Colworth Cemetery Co., [1958] S.C.R. 353;
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the Supreme Court held that the grant of a franchise for natural gas
by the Ontario Fuel Board was an administrative act and not subject
to review. It was not a question of "fact or law" and the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeal does not include substitution of the Board's
views of public convenience and necessity. The Court also made
extensive reference to a judgment in the Court of Appeal in
England 35 in the case of Johnson & Co. (Builders) v. Minister of
Health. 
36
In this case owners of land comprised in a compulsory purchase
order made by a local authority under the Housing Act, 1936, and
confirmed under the Act by the Minister of Health, applied to the
Court to quash the order on the grounds that the Minister, in
considering objections to it, was bound to act in a quasi-judicial
manner.
With respect to the character of the decision, the Court held: 37
The administrative character in which he acts reappears at a later
stage because, after considering the objections, which may be
regarded as the culminating point of his quasi-judicial functions,
there follows something which again, in my view, is purely
administrative, viz., the decision whether or not to confirm the
order. That decision must be an administrative decision, because
it is not to be based purely on the view that he forms of the
objections, vis-a-vis the desires of the local authority, but is to be
guided by his view as to the policy which in the circumstances he
ought to pursue...
In a nutshell, the decision of the Minister is a thing for which he
must be answerable in Parliament, and his actions cannot be
controlled by the courts . . . If the phrase "quasi-judicial" is not
13 D.L.R. (2d) 97, which held that the determination of "public convenience and
necessity" is a matter of opinion (policy) and not of law or of fact. It is stated at
357 (101):
As this Court held in the Union Gas case, supra, the question whether public
convenience and necessity requires a certain action is not one of fact. It is
predominately the formulation of an opinion. Facts must, of course, be
established to justify a decision by the Commission but that decision is one
which cannot be made without a substantial exercise of administrative
discretion. In delegating this administrative discretion to the Commission the
Legislature has delegated to that body the responsibility of deciding, in the
public interest, the need and desirability of additional cemetery facilities, and in
reaching that decision the degree of need and of desirability is left to the
discretion of the Commission.
35. [196612 O.R. at450; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at217.
36. [194712AlIE.R. 395 (C.A.).
37. Id. at 399-400.
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very closely watched, it is apt to lead to the fallacious view that,
the decision of the Minister is in some sense a quasi-judicial
decision which can be challenged on the ground of lack of
evidence, for instance, in the courts in the same way as a judicial
decision might be challenged. In this hybrid mixture of
administrative and quasi-judicial function the two elements are
closely intermingled, but, as I have said, the basic element is the
administrative act which begins, or may begin, before, and ends
after, the quasi-judicial stage has been completed. The word
"quasi-judicial" again leads to a temptation to import into the
area which that expression covers conceptions which are very
suitable to the conduct of an ordinary piece of litigation, but
which are quite unsuitable to the performance the acts which have
been entrusted to the Minister by Parliament.
From this expression the view is upheld that an administrative act
is subject to the control of Parliament unless, by the enabling
statute, judicial controls are intended. But the question whether the
decision is to be performed by means of an administrative, judicial
or quasi-judicial function is one of interpretation. The Ontario Court
of Appeal in Re Cloverdale said:
In discharging some of these functions the Board throughout the
proceedings will be required to act judicially, in others to act
administratively and in still others to discharge the "hybrid"
functions as described.. .38
In summation, the acts of the regulatory agency may be either
administrative, advisory or regulatory. Administrative acts may
result of an exercise of the administrative function, that is,
performed by means of an order that does not require a hearing by
statute or by the common law. 39 Administrative acts may also be
performed in accordance with the quasi-judicial function. 40 Because
they involve considerations of policy, they do not involve the
judicial function.
38. [1966] 20.R. at453; 57 D.L.R. (2d) at 220.
39. Thus the National Energy Board may, pursuant to section 16 of the National
Energy Board (Part VI) Regulations, S.O.R./59 - 435, as am by S.O.R./74-391,
s.1, made by the Governor-in-Council, issue orders for the export of ethylene. But
see infra.
40. All the regulatory agencies under study require that public hearings shall be
held for certain types of applications. See section 19 of the Broadcasting Act and
section 17 of the National Transportation Act. Section 20 of the National Energy
BoardAct (as am. by R.S.C. 1970 1st Supp.), c. 27, s.8) ieads:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), hearings before the Board with regard to the
issue, revocation or suspension of certificates or of licences for the
exportation of gas or power or the importation of gas, or for leave to
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The questions now arise when a regulatory agency is required to
exercise the quasi-judicial function and what are its incidents. These
points were brought up and answered with respect to the application
of the National Energy Board Act and regulations made thereunder
in Re A.-G. of Manitoba and National Energy Board41, decided by
Cattanach J. in the Trial Division of the Federal Court.
In 1971, Dome Petroleum Limited applied to the National Energy
Board for a licence for the export of ethane and to increase the
amounts of propane and butane being exported under existing
contracts pursuant to an arrangement with a company in the United
States of America. At the same time Cochin Pipe Lines Limited
applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for
the construction of a pipeline. No decision was given on these
applications and the National Energy Board, in May 1973,
requested additional evidence which resulted in further hearings
before the Board in July, August and September of that year.
In the meantime, Dow Chemical of Canada Limited had
undertaken and committed itself to the construction of a large
ethylene manufacturing plant in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, and
Cochin Pipe Lines Limited now made application to construct twin
piplines, one to carry the light hydrocarbons, such as propanes and
butanes, and the other to transport ethylene.
As a result of its decision issued in January, 1974, the Board
approved the export of ethane for a lesser period than requested.
The Board also approved construction of the two pipelines.
Although there was some doubt at the time of the hearings, the
Board asserted jurisdiction over ethylene in April, 1974, and Dow
Chemical of Canada Limited consequently made application for the
export of ten (10) billion pounds of ethylene over a ten-year period.
With respect to this application, the Board sent ouf a telex
message to all the parties at the two previous hearings of the
applications by Dome Petroleum Limited and Cochin Pipe Lines
abandon the operation of a pipe line or international power line shall be
public.
(2) When the Board revokes or suspends a certificate or licence upon the
application or with the consent of the holder thereof, a public hearing
need not be held if the pipeline or international power line to which the
certificate or licence relates had not been brought into commercial
operation under that certificate or licence.
(3) The Board may hold a public hearing in respect of any other matter if it
considers it advisable to do so.
41. (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 73 (F.C.T.D.).
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Limited. Cattanach, J. said in his judgment with respect to this
message:
42
The significant content of that message was that the Board would
hear "publicly" the Dow application exparte and that the Board
would "consider written representations" subject to the
conditions that the representations established that the represen-
tator was "directly interested in" or "affected by" the
application...
The learned Judge continued:
It was moved before the Board, when it convened on June 25,
1974, that the Board should alter its decision "to hold an exparte
hearing" in the format set out in the telex message and instead to
hold a public hearing by which was meant that all interested
parties should be afforded the opportunity of cross-examining the
witnesses called by the applicant in support of its application and
to introduce oral evidence in contradiction thereof at the
conclusion of which the applicant would be permitted to make




After having heard argument on the request to so vary the format
of the hearing of the application, the Board announced its
decision, on June 26, 1974, not to vary its prior decision to hold
an "exparte" public hearing.
In short, the Board denied the motion made before it on the
grounds that "the procedure it has selected in disposing of the
Dow application is consistent with the requirements of the
National Energy Board Act and with the requirements of the rules
of natural justice"
Dow Chemical and the Board raised two matters, inter alia, in
their argument against the ruling by the Board in the action initiated
by the Attorney-General for Manitoba. First, the act of the Board
was characterized as administrative and consequently outside the
purview of the judicial arm. Although Cattanach, J. did not attempt
to characterize the act, he said:44
Regardless of how the Board may be characterized, that is as
exercising administrative or executive functions as opposed to
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, Parliament did impose
procedural duties on the Board.
42. Id. at 80.
43. Id at 80-1.
44. Id. at 85.
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In answering the argument that the Board is master of its own
procedure, the Court said:
45
If the Board complies with the express procedural provisions, it
is the master of its own procedure, but, where there is a
complaint, as is here the case, then the Court must decide
whether there has been a failure to observe the principles of
natural justice by being unjust or unfair in some material away to
the persons who complain.
In other words, the Board must abide by the terms of the enabling
statute, by its rules and regulations and by the principles of
fundamental law. In this case, the Court first looked at section 20
and concluded that46 :
The word "public" in the context, in my opinion, means that
every member of the public, subject to the qualification that such
person has a demonstrable interest in the subject-matter before
the Board over and above the public generally, shall have the
right to participate in the hearing.
And,
47
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the meaning to be
ascribed to the word "hearing" as used in s. 20 of the Act is that
of a normal "oral hearing" by which I mean a hearing at which
the Board would be prepared to hear both sides to comment upon
or contradict any information that the Board has obtained, to
permit the parties to adduce oral evidence, to be represented by
counsel, to permit cross-examination of witnesses adverse to
their position and for the Board to act only on information of
probative value.
The learned Judge concluded:
48
Because the National Energy Board Act has bestowed upon the
Board the attributes of a Court and because the statute and the
Regulations contemplate the panoply of a full adversary hearing
it follows that the word "hearing" in 20 of the Act must have
attributed to it the same meaning as it has in a Court of law.
In that sense, a "hearing" before the Board is analogous to and
imports a "trial" before a Court of law
When the Board decided to assert jurisdiction over the ethylene in
April, 1974, it recommended that the Governor in Council pass a
regulation empowering the Board to permit such exports by means
45. Id. at 84.
46. Id. at 86.
47. Id. at 89.
48. Id. at 91.
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of an order rather than by a licence. The major effect of proceeding
by order would be to avoid section 20 of the Act and possibly the
Board need not hold a hearing. The Court made no pronouncement
on the validity of the Order in Council or the authority of the Board
pursuant thereto to authorize the export of ethylene without a public
hearing. In this regard the Court said:
49
Assuming the enactment is procedural only, as it appears to be,
but which question it is not incumbent upon me to decide for
reasons I shall outline, then the Board could by order authorize an
applicant to export ethylene and it is clear from the language of
the amendment, that the Board can make that order ex parte
within the correct meaning of these words.
However, even if a hearing might not be required by the statute
and the regulations, it would seem that the fundamental law might
dictate an oral hearing, as the learned Judge said:50
I fully appreciate that in many instances a hearing need not be an
oral one but may be on written representations. If a tribunal is left
by the legislation creating it with unfettered discretion as to how
to proceed then the tribunal can work out an acceptable procedure
that does not include an oral hearing, but even then there may be
cases where fairness may dictate an oral hearing.
The decision is doubtlessly a landmark in the evolution of
Canadian regulatory tribunals. It has emphasized the predominance
of the public interest aspect; it has the effect of confining the
regulatory agency more strictly to its statutory mandate and
regulations lawfully made thereunder; it has brought into focus the
importance of a judicial procedure, like a "trial" in the regular
court of law. This the regulatory agency may find confining.
However, there is some scope for alleviation of procedural rules in
special circumstances, for example, in respect of the export of small
quantities of gas, oil and electricity by means of "order" rather than
the more formal "licence." The degree of formality or incidents of
the quasi-judicial procedure depends on the statute or, if silent, on
the determination of the court. 51 Regulatory acts, however, may be
performed by use of the administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial
function. Thus the regulatory agency may make orders pursuant to a
general regulation (administrative): it may make an order pursuant
to a judicial function, such as the award of compensation pursuant
49. Id. at 83.
50. Id. at 89.
51. That is, in defining principles of natural justice or of "fair play".
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to section 68 of the National Energy Board Act. Also it may make
regulatory decisions using the quasi-judicial procedure, such as
when the Board member reports back to the Board pursuant to
section 14 of the National Energy Board Act.
The enabling statutes of the regulatory agencies contain
provisions respecting both political and legal controls. The political
controls constraining the agencies differ. Section 23 of the
Broadcasting Act prescribes that the decisions of the Canadian
Radio-Television Commission may be set aside or referred back to
the Commission for reconsideration. Section 64 of the National
Transportation Act provides that the Governor in Council may
rescind any decision of the Commission. Section 44 of the National
Energy Board Act provides that the issue of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the Board must be approved by the
Governor in Council. The Governor in Council would appear to
have almost complete control over the decisions of the Canadian
Radio-Television Commission whereas its control over the
decisions of the Canadian Transport Commission and the National
Energy Board is limited to rejection in the case of the Commission
and to either approval or rejection 52 in the case of the Board,
although the difference is somewhat whimsical.
With respect to legal controls, the three enabling statutes of the
regulatory agencies under study provide for an appeal from
decisions or orders of the agencies to the Federal Court of Appeal
upon questions of law or jurisdiction "upon leave therefor being
obtained from the Court upon application made within one month
after the making of the decision or order sought to be appealed
from." ' 53 It would appear that procedural questions involving
breaches of natural justice are referrable to the Federal Court under
sections 18 and 28 of the Federal Court Act. 54 At all times, of
52. The phrase "subject to the approval of the Governor in Council" as set forth in
section 44 of the National Energy Board Act would appear to be clear. The statute
empowers the Governor-in-Council to approve or not to approve, nothing more.
See R. v. Huntingdon Confirming Authority, Ex parte George and Stanford Hotels
Ltd., [1929] 1 K.B. 698.
53. Federal CourtAct, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1 Annex B.
54. Jackett, C.J. of the Federal Court in The Federal Court of Canada -A Manual
of Practice (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), writes, at 22: "Unlike the
jurisdiction conferred by section 18 on the Trial Division, which is a jurisdiction in
respect of pre-existing well-known remedies, the jurisdiction conferred by section
28 on the Court of Appeal would seem to be defined in the statute itself. It is a
jurisdiction to review and set aside a decision made by a tribunal on the ground that
the tribunal did one of three things . . . There is here no cross-reference to
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course, administrative and regulatory acts when performed by
means of the administrative function are subject to judicial
surveillance. Such acts, expressed as orders, must fall within the
statutory mandate, be reasonable and comply with all conditions
precedent and subsequent. 55
2. The Separation of Functions
According to the Montesquiean doctrine, good government requires
a distinct separation of powers and functions between the
legislature, the executive (administrative) and the judiciary.
Although in England and in Canada the doctrine is not as sharply
defined as in the United States of America, it has a definite impact
on legal thinking in Canada and particularly on the evolution of
Canadian administrative law. 56
By traditional definition, the legislature makes the law, the
executive (administrative) enforces the law and the judiciary
pre-existing remedies and it is to be hoped that his law will turn out to be free of
those rules developed in earlier times that were not based on obvious principles of
justice."
Section 28 of the Federal Court Act reads:
Notwithstanding section 18 or the provisions of any other Act, the Court of
Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application to review and set
aside a decision or order, other than a decision or order of an administrative
nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis, made
by or in the course of proceedings before a federal board, commission or other
tribunal, upon the ground that the board, commission or tribunal
(a) failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond
or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether or not the error
appears on the face of the record; or
(c) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in
a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before
it.
55. See generally, E.A. Driedger, Subordinate Legislation (1960), 38 Can. B.
Rev. 1.
56, "It were curious to follow out the historical growth of the whole theory as to
the "separation of powers". It rests apparently upon Montesquieu's Esprit des
Lois, Book XI, c. 6, and is in some sort the offspring of a double misconception;
Montesquieu misunderstood on this point the principles and practice of the English
constitution, and his doctrine was in turn, if not misunderstood, exaggerated and
misapplied by the French statesman of the Revolution . . . All that we need note is
the extraordinary influence exerted in France, and in all countries which have
followed French examples, by this part of Montesquieu's teaching . . . " A.V.
Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, (10th ed. London: MacMillan, 1959) at
338-39.
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interprets it. In the United States, Articles I, II and III of the
American Constitution provide that all legislative powers shall be
vested in a congress, that the executive power shall be vested in a
president and that the judicial power shall be vested in a supreme
court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. Three distinct branches of government
were thus provided for, each endowed with functions of a peculiar
kind. These functions are controlled by an elaborate system of
"checks and balances" which operate to confine the three branches
to their respective functions as far as practicable. Thus the Senate
was given the power to confirm or reject the President's
appointments and to approve or to disapprove the ratification of
treaties. The President was entrusted with the power of vetoing bills
passed by the Senate and House of Representatives. The judicial
branch was given, at least by implication, the power to determine
the constitutionality of acts of Congress and to review administra-
tive acts of the executive branch. 57 These powers place the judiciary
in the United States system of government in a predominant position
vis-a-vis the other branches.
In England, the exercise of keeping the powers and functions of
government in separate compartments was never practised, as Sir
W. Ivor Jennings so well shows in his treatise.5 8 He points out the
indistinct line between a law passed by Parliament, the regulations
and orders issued by the administration and the decisions handed
down by the judiciary. They are essentially the same in operation
and enforcement. They differ in degree only and in the fact that they
are made by different agencies of government. Similarly, when an
administrative agency enforces any of its own orders, it is
performing a function more or less analogous to the enforcement of
a judicial decree; the distinction is one of machinery.
The truth is that every decision involves the element which I have
mentioned: the general rules, the ascertainment of the facts, the
exercise of the discretion. Sometimes the important question is
the question of law, what general rules do apply to this case.
Sometimes the facts are important. And sometimes the discretion
is the most important. It depends entirely on the particular case. 59
57. For example, see Schechter V. United States 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
overthrowing the National Industrial Recovery Act.
58. W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, supra, note 17, particularly
Chapter 1 and Appendix I.
59. See Ist ed. London: University of London, 1933 at 19.
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The basis of the distinction is well-stated by Griffith and Street:60
Thus the real argument is not whether the Executive, for
example, is exercising legislative or judicial powers which
properly belong to Parliament or the courts (for no kind of power
belongs to any particular authority) but whether the power is
being exercised by the authority best suited to exercise it and
whether the exercise is sufficiently controlled by political and
legal action.
Three similar but distinct consequences of governmental action
have flowed from the English experience. First, the English have
insisted on the complete independence of the judiciary as the best
means of assuring an effective government. Consequently, English
law assures the members of the judiciary considerable immunity
from proceedings in their official capacity and adequate salaries and
security of tenure not enjoyed by other government officials. They
must be chosen from a milieu as completely untainted with bias and
social prejudice as is humanly possible. Although no judge is
entirely free from bias and social prejudice, the English judiciary
has enjoyed a most enviable reputation in the calibre of judges
appointed to this branch of the government.
The second consequence was expressed at any early stage* of
English legal development; namely, that no man should be a judge
in his own cause. 6' But again this consequence is more readily
observable in the United States than in England in respect to its
application to administrative agencies. Thus the United States
federal Administrative Procedure Act 6 2 does not attempt to separate
the internal functions of the American regulatory agency as much as
it attempts to prevent contamination of judging by other functions,
particularly those of investigating and prosecuting. It also prescribes
certain procedural rules to be followed by these agencies, such as
the requirements of notice, opportunity for submission and
consideration, facts and representation of the parties by counsel. The
Act provides that the transcript and records constitute the entire
60.Supra, note 26 at 15-16.
61. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London: Stevens
and Sons, 1973) at 217, says: "And it was Coke himself who had elevated to a
fundamental principle of the common law the proposition that no man should be a
judge in his own cause . . . In Dr. Bonham's case, [(1610) 8 Co. Rep. 114 b]"
However, the learned author continues, at 218: "The common-law disqualifica-
tions for interest and bias may be waived. They may also be removed by statute, by
express words or necessary intendment."
62. Administrative Procedure Act, (1946) 60 Stat. 237-244, as revised (1966) 80
Stat. 381.
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record. But mainly the Act provides for detachment of the
decision-makers from the administrative processes of the agency.
The third consequence of the development of governmental
functions from the English experience is the doctrine of supremacy
of Parliament. Not only does this doctrine mean that the legislature
is supreme but also that all governmental officials are responsible to
it. Unlike in the United States, the judiciary is subordinate to the
Parliament and recognizes its inferior position in many circums-
tances, particularly in its control of ministers of the Crown. 63
We now turn to the Canadian position. Considering the first
consequence, the Canadian regulatory agencies are more closely
akin to their American prototypes than to those in England. They
are constituted courts of records with powers analogous to those of
civil courts. 64 Their acts are ostensibly free from direct ministerial
control. 65 Their members have defined salaries, tenure and status
somewhat similar to appointments to the judicial branch of
government. However, their relationship with the political branch
of government lies somewhere in between the English and
American experiences.
The second consequence, namely that of separation of investigat-
ory powers from those of decision-making are not so evident. The
close connection between the investigatory personnel and the
Minister in the English experience has not provided much case law
on this point. The Canadian position is well illustrated in a recent
Ontario decision. 66 In this case, a member of an administrative
agency, the Ontario Securities Commission, 67 concerned himself
actively with the form of certain charges against registered voters
63. See generally, B.L. Strayer, Injunctions against Crown Officers (1964), 42
Can. B. Rev. 1.
64. In Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Montreal Terminal Railway Co. (1905), 36
S.C.R. 369, Nesbitt, J. stated that "the fullest possible effect should be given to
the language" (at 385) of the equivalent wording of subsection (3) of the National
Transportation Act, which makes the Canadian Transport Commission (at that time
the Board of Railway Commissioners) a court of record.
65. Generally, in England, the effective power with respect to such matters as
slum clearances, new housing and transport is given to the Minister, who must
satisfy himself, either by the inquiry or by independent investigation, whether the
order should be made. See Griffith and Street, supra, note 26 at Chapter 4 for a
general outline of the powers and functions of major administrative agencies in
England.
66. Re W.D. Latimer Co. and A.-G. for Ontario (1974), 2 O.R. (2d) 391; 43
D.L.R. (3d) 58 (Ont. H.C.-D.C.).
67. Created under theSecurities Act, R. S.0. 1970, c. 426.
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and then sat on the panel which heard the evidence in the matter. He
was not disqualified nor was the decision upset. The court held that
it depended on the circumstances whether the act constituted a
breach of the common law and of natural justice and, here "I do not
think that in all these circumstances unfairness should be
apprehended by reasonable or right-minded persons.' '68
The third major consequence of this evolution of governmental
powers is that of parliamentary supremacy and, in particular,
administrative and judicial subordination to parliament. At first
sight the doctrine may appear to conflict with the concept of judicial
independence, but, in reality, it only means that the legislation
passed by Parliament transcends all other laws. It does not in any
form connote administrative control of the judiciary. 69 However
parliamentary control over the acts of the administration, which
includes the acts of the regulatory agency, is another matter.
3. Possible conflict of powers, functions and interests and their
legal and political controls.
We have noted that one of the consequences of the doctrine of
separation of functions is that policy-making should be divorced
from policy-interpreting (enforcing). That is, one man or body
68. (1974) 2 O.R. (2d) at 405; 43 D.L.R. (3d) at 72. However the court continued:
". .. I am of the opinion that the statute makes it clear that the hearing
contemplated in s. 8 of the Securities Act may be conducted by the Commission as
it may be constituted at its inception whether or not the Commissioners then sitting
have been present at previous meetings of the Commission where duties of the
Commission under the Act concerning the hearing on the matters of which the
hearing arises have been considered." (Id.)
69. By a fundamental principle of our constitution, those to whom the
administration of justice is entrusted are not responsible to Parliament except for
actual misconduct in office. A. Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England
(2d ed. London: Longmans, 1887) at 574, states: Complaints to Parliament in
respect of the conduct of the judiciary, or the decisions of courts of justice should
not be lightly entertained. 'If there is a failure in the administration of justice, from
whatever cause, affecting any judge, both Houses of Parliament may address the
crown, to remove that judge from office.' But 'nothing could be more injurious to
the administration of justice than that the House of Commons should take upon
itself the duties of a court of review of the proceedings of an ordinary court of law;'
or of the decisions of a competent legal tribunal, or, that it should 'tamper with the
question whether the judges are on this or that particular assailable', and endeavour
'to inflict upon them a minor punishment' by subjecting their official conduct to
hostile criticism. Parliament should abstain from all interference with the judiciary,
except in cases 'of such gross perversion of the law, either by intention, corruption,
or incapacity, as to make it necessary for the House to exercise the power vested in
it of advising the crown for the removal of the judge'.
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should not be enabled to declare what the policy is and then enforce
it. Essentially the rule exists because one man's interpretation will
be flavoured and influenced by his preconceptions in framing it.
This would be a form of bias, and impartiality - the goal of
interpreting - is thereby sacrificed. We will now observe some
areas of possible conflicts of powers, functions and interests in the
Canadian regulatory agency and then briefly consider legal and
political curbs thereon.
Administrative and advisory acts have been defined as those
performed by the higher echelons of governments, operating in the
policy field with no, or if some, indefinite standards to guide them.
They may be performed by the administrative function - in which
case, the major criterion is whether the power to do the act has been
validly granted to the body or individual. Thus the National Energy
Board may be empowered to grant orders authorizing the export of
ethylene. If so, no hearing may be required. It is an administrative
act validly accomplished within the agency's legal powers. 70 Such
acts are subject to the political control of the legislature although the
courts will review acts of the higher executive when they are
exercised arbitrarily or in bad faith. 71 Generally such administrative
acts are beyond the pale of judicial review. They operate in the
realm of policy in the sense that, although private rights may be
affected, they are made in the public interest, for the common good.
Similar observations may be made with respect to the advisory
powers given to the regulatory agency by the legislature. The
advisory acts given in pursuance of this power receive their validity
from the fundamental principle of responsible government. These
acts are reviewable by the legislature and not by the courts. 72 But
when the regulatory agency is also empowered to decide questions
relative to the given advice, it may be argued that such advice may
be considered a prejudgment and that the impartiality of the agency
is brought into question.
70. See, for example, Calgary Power Ltd. v. Copithorne, [19591 S.C.R. 24; 16
D.L.R. (2d) 241, where, at 33 (250), Martland, J. said: "His decision is as a
Minister of the Crown and, therefore, a policy decision, taking into account the
public interest, and for which he would be answerable only to the Legislature."
71. See, for example, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121; 16 D.L.R. (2d)
689, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the act of cancellation of a
licence by the then Premier of Quebec was not in accordance with established law
and therefore was unlawful.
72. See B.L. Strayer, Injunctions Against Crown Officers (1964), 42 Can. B. Rev.
1 at 29-31.
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Is there a conflict here in the regulatory agency? First, it is to be
noted that legislative acts are beyond the application of rules
respecting bias and interest. 73 We do not question the motives of
our legislators, at least on the basis of bias and interest. Second,
advisory acts are recommendations only. As illustrated in Part II of
the National Energy Board Act, this power takes the form of
recommendations to the Minister. In order to arrive at the advice to
be given, the Board may, and often does, consult with other
departments and agencies of government, hold conferences with
industry and intra-governmental agencies and generally obtain its
information from whichever sources it deems best. The very reasons
for the regulatory agency - its flexibility, expertise and celerity -
place it in a foremeost postion to give advice. This source of
expertise should not be denied to the government because it might,
on granting privileges to private parties, be influenced by the advice
it has given. Finally, it is a recognized judicial function in
Canada.
74
But the administrative act may be and most often is performed
and the advice may be given after a hearing. This fact does not, it is
submitted, alter the fundamental nature of the act; that is, that the
act is one of policy based on expediency in the light of the public
interest.
With respect to the exercise of advisory powers, if the advice is
given after a public hearing, it is an opinion and a final decision. No
rights are affected directly but there may be reasons for the
application of certain principles of natural justice. Thus, in R. v.
Minister of Labour, Ex parte General Supplies Ltd.7 5 when the
minister requested the Board for certain information prior to
granting permission to prosecute, ostensibly an administrative
function, the Board refused the applicant permission to view
documents and to cross-examine on affidavits. On application to the
court for certiorari, it was held that the documents should have been
tested by cross-examination. Similarly all forms of information
gathering hearings may be subject to judicial control. They are
exercises of the quasi-judicial function and the attributes prescribed
73. S.A. deSmith, supra, note 61 at219.
74. See, for example, Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia,
[1967] S.C.R. 792; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 (sub nom. Reference Re Ownership of
Off-Shore Mineral Rights.)
75. (1964) 47 D.L.R. (2d) 189; 49 W.W.R. 488 (sub nom. Re Labour Act; Re
Otes and General Supplies Ltd.) (Alta. S.C.).
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will depend on the characterization of the act and the nature of all
the circumstances.7
6
Administrative acts may result from the employment of the
quasi-judicial function. How far do these acts conflict with the
advisory act? The answer to this question may be arrived at by
considering the legal concept of bias.
Bias comes in many forms. First and probably the most obvious
form that bias presents itself in is personal bias; for example, a
member of the regulatory agency may have a pecuniary interest in a
company applying to the National Energy Board for a licence to
export power. This is clear. The member should disqualify himself
or be disqualified from the decision-making panel. Similarly any
personal interest of a definite, concrete kind should disqualify.
However, everyone has biases in the sense that he or she has
preconceived ideas of policy - what it is and what it should be.
This is unavoidable. If strong positions on different points of view
are a basis for disqualification in the decision-making process, few
people of any worth would be available to fill positions on panels or
regulatory agencies. Also, adherence to preconceived ideas should
not be objectionable as regulatory agencies should issue and often
do issue policy statements which they intend to follow in a general
way in the future. Certainly bias in the sense of crystallized
knowledge about law or policy is not sufficient grounds for
disqualification. A person who is biased in this sense might well be
the best qualified person for the position. Panel members are
human. Each member will bring to the regulatory agency ethics and
values that will inevitably be reflected in the decisions in which he
participates. The mere fact that he has prejudged the facts and has
given advice should not be sufficient to offset the expertise that is
required in the complex fields in which he operated so long as his
performance does not foreclose inquiry and examination. Otherwise
stated, so long as his preconceptions are not of such a nature as to
unduly narrow a broad perspective of a subject, his participation in
76. The United States federal Administrative Procedure Act recognizes that a
statute may require a hearing without requiring a trial as it distinguishes hearings
for the purposes of rule making and adjudication.
K.C. Davis, Administrative Lav Treatise (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1958) Vol. I at
433 states: "When adjudicative facts are not at issue, so that a trial is not
necessarily required, the need often is not for opportunity for hearing but is for
opportunity for party participation in the determination of the governmental
action."
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the advisory act should not disqualify. As our law does not forbid
following previously decided cases," or policy directives, the
judiciary should take considerable care in defining this incident or
attribute of the quasi-judicial function.
However, regulatory agencies are created courts of record by the
enabling statutes and the independence of the judiciary is a
sacrosanct principle of Canada law. Impartiality, even in matters
concerned with granting of privileges, needs to be evident in our
regulatory tribunals. They operate in a judicial aura using, for the
most part, solemn judicial procedures; the regulatory agency must
take care not only to do justice but to be seen to do justice.
The regulatory agency should not be unduly influenced; certainly
dictation to the regulatory agency by any body, particularly the
government of the day, is not to be countenanced. The agency
would soon lose the respect of its jurisdictional entities, lend itself
to all forms of criticism and become inept and useless for the
purposes for which it was created. 79 There are strong legal
precedents in support of the proposition; namely, that the decision
must be the result of the exercise of the discretion of the authority to
whom the power was given by law.
In Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 80 the plaintiff, a proprietor of a
restaurant in Montreal and the holder of a licence to sell intoxicating
liquor, sued Mr. Duplessis, the then Premier of Quebec, personally
for damages arising out of the cancellation of his licence by the
77. Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis is firmly rooted in our case law. Although
it would appear desirable that for the purposes of consistency, expediency and
uniformity, Canadian administrative agencies should follow precedents, their
obligation to exercise discretion in particular cases seems to foreclose a complete
adoption of the doctrine by them.
78. "It is obviously desirable that a tribunal should openly state any general
principles by which it intends to be guided in the exercise of its discretion." S.A.
de Smith, supra, note 61 at 276.
79 "The relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarized
as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to
exercise the discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a
discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. The
authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under
the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each
individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has
been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must
act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, must not seek to
promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it
power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously." Id. at 252-253.
80. [1959] S.C.R. 121; 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689.
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Quebec Liquor Commission. It was alleged that the licence had be
arbitrarily cancelled at the instigation of the defendant who, without
legal powers, had given orders to the Quebec Liquor Commission to
cancel it because of his activities on behalf of Jehovah Witnessess.
The defendant contended, inter alia, that the provincial Act
empowered the Commission to cancel any permit at its discretion
and that the judicary could not interfere with the exercise of this
discretion.
Generally with respect to "discretion", the late Rand, J. said:
81
In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute
and untrammelled "discretion" . . . "Discretion" necessarily
implies good faith in discharging public duty; there is always a
perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any
clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as
fraud or corruption.
With respect to the Premier's intervention, he continued:
82
. . . an administration according to law is to be superseded by
action dictated by and according to the arbitrary likes, dislikes
and irrelevant purposes of public officers acting beyond their
duty, would signalize the beginning of disintegration of the rule
of law as a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure.
However, more with respect to our point on dictation by another
authority, Martland, J. stated:
83
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the right of
cancellation of a permit under that Act is a substantial power
conferred upon what the statute contemplated as an independent
commission. That power must be exercised solely by the
corporation. It must not and cannot be exercised by anyone else.
He then refers to Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Trade, 84 where
Lord Selbourne Said:. ...
He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he
must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of
some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given
by law.
A rather indefinite direction was given to public authorities to
ignore political policy in rendering decisions by the English Court
81. Id. at 140; 16 D.L.R. (2d) at 705.
82. Id. at 142; 16 D.L.R. (2d) at 706-07.
83. Id. at 156; 16 D.L.R. (2d) at 742.
84. (1885), 10 App. Cas. 229 at240.
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of Appeal in Monkland v. Jack Barclay Ltd. 8 5 The question before
the Court was whether a certain contract was contrary to public
policy and therefore void. A minor argument advanced was that the
Government or Government officials had given approval to a
general contract scheme which included the offensive clause sub
judice. The Court held that his consideration was not relevant as
public policy was not to be confused with political policy. Political
policy changed with each government and was not to be a factor in
determining public policy for common law purposes.
8 6
Although the cases indicate the conclusion that a strict
detachment from outside interferences in rendering discretionary
decisions is called for, this does not mean that the regulatory agency
must be completely oblivious to the policy of the government of the
day. Two of the enabling statutes 87 of the regulatory agencies under
study require that the agencies make their decisions having "regard
to all relevant considerations." 8 8 Surely the policy of the existing
government is relevant consideration. De Smith says in this regard
that:
85. [1951] 2 K.B.252 (C.A.) at 265-66.
86. The Courts have also held that the surrender or independent discretion in
favour of adopting a policy pursued by a superior authority is no less improper
because the superior authority has not sought to impose its policy. InR. v. Stepney
Corporation, 1902] 1 K.B. 317, where the Council of a metropolitan borough,
having resolved to abolish the office of a vestry clerk to a local authority,
considered that it was bound by an ascertained practice of the Treasury to make
certain deductions in compensation, it was held as the Council did not exercise a
discretion which the law imposed, there was no real judgment. The Council did not
act and mandamus issued to compel them to do so.
In Buttle v. Buttle, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1217; [1953] 2 All E.R. 646 (P.D.A.) a
husband had deserted his wife and, in attempting to upset a maintenance order, the
husband contended that the domestic proceedings court gave consideration in
reaching its decision to a Home Office circular issued under authority of the
Secretary of State. The Court held in part:
• . . the magistrates have gone wrong by purporting to follow the advice given
in a circular which in itself is not wholly accurate (per Lord Merriman. P. at
1221 (649)). It is particularly desirable, in documents such as this, that it should
be made clear beyond doubt that the document is not intended to supersede the
discretion of the court or its duty to form its own opinion in each particular case
as to what is the just order to make on all evidence in that case (per Pearce, J. at
1221).
87. National Energy Board Act, s. 44; Transport Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-14, s.
33(3).
88. In Canadian National Railways v. Canadian Steamship Lines Ltd., [1945]
A.C. 204; [1945] 3 D.L.R. 417 it is stated at 211 (420): "It would be difficult to
consider a wider discretion than is conferred on the board as to the considerations to
which it is to have regard in disposing of an application for the approval of an
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Authorities directly entrusted with statutory discretions .. are
usually entitled and are often obliged to take into account
considerations of public policy, and in some contexts the policy
of a Minister or of the Government as a whole may be a relevant
factor in weighing those considerations.
89
In the High Court of Australia's decision of R. v. Mahoney, Ex
parte Johnson9" the question concerned the discretionary authority
of a licensing officer under a statutory provision that he "may
cancel a licence issued." He had cancelled certain licences in line
with a government policy respecting trade unions and Evatt J.
noted: 91
In order to show that the respondent's discretion was influenced
by irrelevant matters, much has been made of the fact that the
respondent has stated, in his very candid affidavit, that he paid
regard to Commonwealth Executive policy, although receiving
no dictation from the Government.
If it is assumed that the licensing officer has a discretion to
refuse licences, I think that he is not debarred from considering
the existence of such a policy. He would be regarded not as a
judicial but as an administrative officer vested with discretionary
power. He would have to act honestly, but he might well pay
some regard to the preference scheme favoured by the
Government. He would be expected to pay special attention to
the requirements of the part which, in a sense, is committed to his
charge. Above all, the discretion to be exercised would be his
discretion and he could not allow the Executive or any other
person to exercise it for him. Upon the same assumption of a
discretion, there is no reason why he should not be allowed to
seek the opinions of persons well experienced in the methods of
providing and organizing labour. It cannot be assumed that the
well experienced and the well qualified are absent from the
responsible Executive of the day. The weight the licensing officer
might see fit to attach to any or all of such opinions would be a
matter entirely for him.
Another and more recent decision of the High Court of Australia
lends further light. In R. v. Anderson, Ex parte ipec-Air Pty.
agreed charge. It is to have regard to "all considerations which appear to it to be
relevant." Not only is it not precluded negatively from having regard to any
considerations, but it is enjoined positively to have regard to every consideration
which in its opinion is relevant. So long as that discretion is exercised in good faith
the decision of the Board as to what considerations are relevant would appear to be
unchallengeable."
89. Supra, note 61 at 273.
90. (1931) 46 C.L.R. 131.
91. Id. at 145.
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Limited,92 the prosecutor, pursuant to clause 4 of the Customs
(Prohibited Imports) Regulations, requested "the permission in
writing of the Director-General of Civil Aviation" to import certain
freight aircraft with which it might operate to carry freight between
cities in the six states of the Commonwealth. The prosecutor was
informed by the Director-General that he thought it necessary to
seek the views of the government on its civil aviation policies before
deciding the application and the government did not favour the
importation of aircraft as it considered that the provision of further
facilities for the operation of trunk route freight services by air at
that time could not be justified on economic grounds. The
Director-General, having obtained the government's view to this
effect, refused the application, having had regard inter alia, to the
government's policy views.
Two judges (Taylor and Owen JJ.) refused to issue a mandamus
on the ground that whether or not permission was to be given was a
matter left to the Director-General's discretion which was to be
exercised upon broad considerations relating to civil aviation in the
Commonwealth.
Kitto J. said:93
It may be conceded that where the law confers a power of
discretionary decision upon an officer of the civil service in his
official capacity Government policy is not in every case an
extraneous matter which he must put out of consideration.
Indeed, Evatt J. thought that such case existed in R. v. Mahoney;
Ex parte Johnson. I express no opinion as to whether the relevant
provisions of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations
provide another instance. Even if they do, the fact is that in
dealing with the application in question in this case the
Director-General did not arrive at a decision of his own after
taking account of some matter of general Government policy.
What he did was to seek from his Minister, and then
automatically obey, an ad hoc pronouncement from the
Government as to the direction in which he might decide the
matter. That is a very different thing; and none the less so
because the Government made its pronouncement in line with a




When a discretion to give permission for the importation of some
92. (1965) 113 C.L.R. 177.
93. Id. at 192-93.
94. Id. at 201-02.
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article has been given to the head of a Commonwealth
department, it would, I think, be wrong to deny that the officer
who occupies the position could take government policy into
consideration in deciding whether to grant or to refuse
permission.
There is, nevertheless, a significant difference between a
discretion given to a minister and one given to a departmental
head. When the latter is nominated, he must arrive at his own
decision upon the merits of the application and must not merely
express a decision made by the government. The position in
which such an officer is put is not an easy one but the sound
theory behind conferring a discretion upon a departmental head
rather than his minister is that government policy should not
outweigh every other consideration. A sound governmental
tradition of respect for those who shoulder the responsibilities of
their office in making unwelcome decisions makes the choice of a
departmental head, rather than his minister, as the one to exercise




* . . I think his duty is to obey all lawful directions of the
Minister under whom he serves the Crown.
This last expression would appear to be at variance with the intent of
Parliament in conferring the discretion at odds with the concept of
independence of deciding bodies in English jurisprudence, upsetting
to a major reason for the existence of the regulatory agency96 and,
possibly most important, contrary to many judicial expressions.
We turn now to possible conflicts between the powers, functions
and interests in respect of the regulatory acts of the agency. They
may exist but are not too apparent in this embryo stage of
development of the Canadian regulatory agency. Here might be
observed in effect some conflict between the regulation-making
authority and the regulation-enforcing authority because if the
regulations are made either by the Minister, by the Board, or by the
Governor in Council, the same official may make them as well as
enforce them. Regulations may be made for the safety of pipeline
operations, for safety of aircraft and for various financial matters
that the regulating authority controls. Thus these regulations may be
made and enforced by the same officials. However, there would
appear to be adequate political and legal controls to contain this
95. Id. at 206.
96. Supra
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conduct. At all times the officials may be kept to the letter of the
regulations under which they operate even if they are exercising the
administrative function. 97 Also the internal procedures for dismissal
or supervision are usually adequate to control such conduct.
There remains a brief consideration of conflicts arising from the
employment of officials of the regulatory agency to make reports, to
inspect and generally to perform administrative and quasi-judicial
functions on a subsidiary scale. Examiners may report to the Board
or Commission in respect of safety aspects of railways and
pipelines. If the examiners merely report facts to the Board, it
would apparently be an exercise of the administrative function.9 8 If
the report affects the rights of citizens in some way, it could be
classified as quasi-judicial and incidents of fair play would be
attached to the proceeding. What is the nature of the function? If
there is any doubt, the form of the proceedings should be conformed
to judicial concepts of national justice as far as possible.
4. Conclusion
Although some conflicts of powers, functions and interests exist in
the Canadian regulatory agency, they appear to be less than real and
political and legal controls appear to be adequate to handle them.
Although the Board of Transport Commissioners, the predecessors
of the Canadian Transport Commission have been operating since
before the turn of the century, the regulatory agency, as a governing
device, is relatively new in Canada. With the English and American
experiences as guides, the device is thriving and no doubt will be
used more and more as time goes on in particular fields of
specialized activity. There are, of course, some "grey" areas
which, it is submitted, will be satisfactorily clarified only by time,
publicity, critical examination and remedial action to suit peculiar
Canadian conditions.
The semantic difficulties in making an analysis and assessment of
the acts, powers, and functions of the regulatory agency are
frustrating. Courts have defined acts in different ways to suit
particular situations and we have no generally accepted terminol-
ogy. For example, the terms "executive" and "administrative" are
97. Shawn v. Robertson, [196412 O.R. 696; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 363 (Ont. H.C.).
98. R.F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971)
says at 147: "This has become a quite common approach in Canadian
jurisprudence."
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often used interchangeably; there is no clearly defined line between
"judicial" and "quasi-judicial"; administrative acts are often
interpreted as including all acts classified as "non-judicial"; and so
&on.
For the purposes of this paper, the regulatory agency performs
three distinct types of acts, - administrative, advisory and
regulatory. These acts may be performed by the legislative,
administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The legislative
function is generally confined to those acts resulting in rules,
regulations and orders of general application. However this
distinction is only valid from the point of view of the regulatory
agency as from the vantage point of the jurisdictional entity the act
might be the result of the exercise of the legislative or
administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions; the act would
have the same effect on the jurisdictional entity.
The administrative function is essentially the fact that an act,
either administrative, advisory or regulatory, has been accomp-
lished without any application of the "judicial" or "quasi-judicial"
functions. That is, the agency does an act under its statutory powers
which does not require any of the "trappings" of a court. Thus a
policy act may be done, advice may be given, or a regulatory act
performed without any interference with the "privileges", "rights"
of or other disadvantages to individuals or jurisdictional entities to
which the statute or common law ascribe certain procedural
safeguards. This is often called an administrative act but it is more
precisely and correctly called a regulatory act that is performed in an
administrative manner.
In one sense, there is nothing to be gained by distinguishing
between "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" functions. The words
appear to be used interchangeably for the most part in the case law.
However the distinction would appear to be justified by using the
term "quasi-judicial" as connoting those procedural attributes or
incidents which the administrative agency employs in accordance
with statutory directives and the fundamental law in arriving at its
decisions; whereas judicial functions connote those circumstances
where all the powers ascribed to a regular court of law must be
complied with by the administrative agency. But there is difficulty
here, too. Administrative agencies exercising functions most
analogous to a court never have all the judicial "trappings" of the
regular courts. They are, in reality, exercising "quasi-judicial"
functions which the enabling statute and the fundamental law
38 The Dalhousie Law Journal
indicates should be applied. We can hope that another reason for the
regulatory agency may be found in providing a vehicle for
clarification and precision of terminology in this important and
growing branch of the Canadian legal system. *
